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Liability for Damage Caused by the
Accidental Operation of a Strategic
Defense Initiative System
Introduction
Since the Soviet Union tested the first intercontinental ballistic missile
("ICBM") l in 1957, the United States and the Soviet Union have pur-
sued various proposals to defeat the threat posed by nuclear armed
ICBMs. 2 The U.S.S.R. currently maintains a network of ground-based
missiles capable, in theory, of defending Moscow against a limited ICBM
attack.3 The U.S. began operating its only anti-ballistic missile system
("ABM"), "Safeguard," in 1975.4 Since deactivating the system in 1976,
the U.S. has had no capability for defense against ICBMs.5
In a national television address on March 23, 1983, President Ron-
ald Reagan introduced a novel plan to defend the United States and its
allies against nuclear attack.6 The plan, a "Strategic Defense Initiative"
("SDI"), envisioned a system of space-based devices designed to detect
and destroy nuclear weapons launched against the U.S. Budget con-
straints, limitations on technical feasibility, and political exigencies have
necessitated frequent redirection of the efforts of SDI strategists and
scientists. 7 Nonetheless, SDI has become a significant element in both
1. An ICBM is a "land-based fixed or mobile rocket-propelled vehicle capable of
delivering a warhead to intercontinental ranges." T. COCHRAN, W. ARKIN & M. HOE-
NIG, NUCLEAR WEAPONS DATABOOK, VOLUME I: U.S. NUCLEAR FORCES AND CAPABILI-
TIES 318 (1984) [hereinafter COCHRAN].
2. See N.Y. Times, Oct. 28, 1986, at C1.
3. The 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty limits the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. to a
force of no more than 200 anti-ballistic missiles. Each State's missiles were to be
divided evenly between two sites. In 1974, the U.S. and U.S.S.R. modified the Treaty
to permit no more than 100 missiles, all based at one site. N.Y. Times, Oct. 28, 1986,
at C3, col. 4. In accordance with the Treaty, the U.S.S.R. maintains a system of
GALOSH anti-ballistic missiles deployed around Moscow. See BALLISTIC MISSILE
DEFENSE 198-99 (A. Carter & D. Schwartz eds. 1984).
4. See Carter & Schwartz, supra note 3, at 340-42; N.Y. Times, Oct. 28, 1986, at
C3, col. 4.
5. Since 1976, however, the United States has developed several prototype ABM
weapons. See COCHRAN, supra note 1, at 103-07.
6. N.Y. Times, Mar. 24, 1983, at Al, col. 6.
7. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, July 15, 1986, at A20, col. 3 (key Senators and adminis-
tration officials dispute whether aspects of an SDI program will violate the 1972 Anti-
Ballistic Missile Treaty); N.Y. Times,June 15, 1986, at Al, col. 1 (the explosion of the
space shuttle Challenger and other recent setbacks to the U.S. space program cause
disarray in the SDI project); N.Y. Times, June 15, 1986, at A12, col. 5 (total budget
21 CORNELL INT'L LJ. 317 (1988)
Cornell International Law Journal
the Reagan and Bush Administration platforms. Progress toward an
operational SDI system has been rapid enough for some experts to fore-
see deployment of certain elements of the system by the early 1990s.8
This Note discusses the issue of liability for harm caused by the acci-
dental operation of an SDI system. 9 The discussion demonstrates that,
although the Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused
by Space Objects (the "Convention")' 0 is the principal source of law,
the Convention fails to resolve satisfactorily liability issues concerning
an SDI system. This Note then suggests principles and rules to address
these issues.
Section I provides a background to the legal instruments addressing
liability for space activity. Section IIA concludes that the Convention
supersedes earlier documents, constituting the most conclusive state-
ment of current liability law, and analyzes the applicability of the Con-
vention to harm caused by an SDI system. Section IIB proposes new
rules to govern the determination and allocation of liability for harm
resulting from an SDI system malfunction.
This Note assumes that the destructive elements of an SDI system
are based on satellites orbiting the Earth. An inherent problem of such
a system is the possibility of an attack on an object the system errone-
ously identifies as hostile.'I The malfunction could damage or destroy
target objects and injure or kill any passengers on board.
for SDI research, estimated at $26 billion after President Reagan's March, 1983
speech, is now estimated at $90 billion. Some experts estimate that the total budget
for SDI development will exceed $I trillion); N.Y. Times,June 14, 1986, at AI, col. 2
(Senate Armed Services Committee reduces by nearly $1.4 billion President Reagan's
proposed 1987 SDI budget); N.Y. Times, May 27, 1986, at A16, col. 1 (experts skep-
tical on SDI computer reliability); N.Y. Times, Sept. 26, 1986, at A14 (suggesting that
deployment of an SDI system could increase the probability of a nuclear war). See also
Carter & Schwartz, supra note 3, at 355-57; WEAPONS IN SPACE 109-25 (F. Long, D.
Hafner &J. Boutwell eds. 1986); Smith, Legal Implications of a Space-Based Ballistic Mis-
sile Defense, 15 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 52, 54-57 (1985). For a general discussion of SDI
weapons technologies, see Carter & Schwartz, supra note 3, at 49-97; Space-Based Bal-
listic Missile Defense, Sci. AM., Oct. 1984, at 39-49; N.Y. Times, Mar. 5, 1985, at Al,
col. 4.
8. N.Y. Times, Oct. 19, 1986, at 14, col. 4.
9. Although this Note addresses the proposed U.S. SDI system, its analysis
applies to any space-based ABM system.
10. Adopted in G.A. Res. 2777 (XXVI), Nov. 29, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 2398, T.I.A.S. No.
7762, opened for signature Mar. 29, 1972, entered into force Oct. 9, 1973. The
Convention elaborated upon the liability provisions of the Declaration and the Outer
Space Treaty, and superseded these instruments as the authoritative declaration of
the signatories' responsibilities regarding space activity.
11. This Note does not focus, except incidentally, on an SDI system that causes
damage by behaving in a completely unintended fashion, for example, by colliding
with other space objects or by uncontrolled and unintended emission of harmful
radiation or chemicals.
It is possible that some components of an SDI system could attack targets on the
surface or in the atmosphere of the Earth. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Feb. 15, 1987, at A1,
col. 4; N.Y. Times, Mar. 7, 1985, at Al, col. 3. This Note examines only the issue of
liability for harm caused to objects in space.
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I. Background
A. Early Liability Law
The Soviet Union launched Sputnik I, the first artificial satellite, on Octo-
ber 4, 1957. The Sputnik launch came early in the International Geo-
physical Year, an eighteen-month period of cooperative international
observation of the Earth and the upper atmosphere. These events
focused international attention on space, and prompted the U.N. Gen-
eral Assembly to establish an ad hoc Committee on the Peaceful Uses of
Outer Space ("COPUOS").I
2
The General Assembly directed COPUOS to explore, inter alia, "the
nature of legal problems which may arise in the carrying out of pro-
grams to explore outer space."' 3 COPUOS established a Legal Sub-
Committee,1 4 the purpose of which was to identify and recommend
means of resolving legal problems associated with space activity.
COPUOS's first report to the General Assembly recognized that harm
might result from space activity. 15
COPUOS delivered to the General Assembly a series of progres-
sively more detailed statements of law on liability for space activity. The
first statement was the Declaration of Legal Principles Governing Activi-
ties in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space ("Declaration"), adopted
by the General Assembly on December 13, 1963.16 The Declaration
advanced the principle that a State bears international responsibility for
its outer space activities. 17 In 1967, the General Assembly adopted the
Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Explora-
12. In a speech before the U.N. General Assembly, U.S. Secretary of State John
Foster Dulles proposed the creation of a committee "to prepare for a fruitful pro-
gram on international cooperation in the peaceful uses of outer space." C. CHRIS-
TOL, THE MODERN INTERNATIONAL LAW OF OUTER SPACE 13 (1982); M. LACHS, THE
LAW OF OUTER SPACE 30 (1972); G.A. Res. 1348 (XIII), Dec. 13, 1958. See Reis, Some
Reflection on the Liability Convention for Outer Space, 6J. SPACE L. 125 (1978) ("In 1959
the United States proposed that among the problems arising from space activity
which merited prompt attention was the question of international liability for dam-
ages caused by the launching, flight and re-entry of payloads and associated launch
vehicles"). G.A. Res. 1472 (XIV), Dec. 12, 1959 (established COPUOS as a perma-
nent body).
13. M. LAcHs, supra note 12, at 38.
14. COPUOS created its Legal Sub-Committee at its Second Session in 1959.
Each COPUOS member State is a member of the Sub-Committee. See Report of the
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Space, U.N. Doc. A/5181, at 4 (1962).
15. Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, 14
U.N. GAOR 1-27, U.N. Doc. A/4141 (July 14, 1959).
16. G.A. Res. 1962 (Dec. 13, 1963). The Declaration recites, at art. XVIII, that
"[e]ach State which launches or procures the launching of an object into outer space,
and each State from whose territory or facility an object is launched is internationally
liable for damage to a foreign State or to its natural or juridical persons by such
object or its component parts on the earth, in air space, or in outer space." Matte
describes a General Assembly resolution as "[legally,] no more than [a] recommen-
dation," as compared to an international treaty, which States pledge individually to
observe. SPACE ACTIrlvmES AND EMERGING INTERNATIONAL LAw 84 (N. Matte ed.
1984).
17. G.A. Res. 1962, supra note 16.
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tion and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and other Celestial
Bodies ("Outer Space Treaty").1 8 Article VII of the Outer Space Treaty
essentially codified the liability principle of the Declaration. 19
B. The Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by
Space Objects
The General Assembly instructed COPUOS to give priority to the nego-
tiation of an agreement that would "elaborate effective international
rules and procedures concerning liability for damage caused by space
objects and . . . ensure, in particular, the prompt payment under the
terms of this Convention of a full and equitable measure of compensa-
tion to victims of such damage."'20 The General Assembly considered
neither the Declaration nor the Outer Space Treaty to be a satisfactory
exposition of rules and procedures concerning liability for space activ-
ity.2 1 Conflict over the appropriate rules for determining compensation
and procedures for the settlement of claims bedeviled COPUOS's
attempts to produce an agreement. 22 After protracted negotiations,
however, COPUOS presented the Convention.
2 3
18. 18 U.S.T. 2410, T.I.A.S. No. 6347, 610 U.N.T.S. 205, 610 U.N.T.S. 206,
opened for signatureJan. 27, 1967, entered into force Oct. 10, 1967.
19. Article VII declares that "[e]ach State Party to the Treaty that launches or
procures the launching of an object into outer space ... and each State Party from
whose territory an object is launched, is internationally liable for damage to another
State Party to the Treaty or to its natural or juridical persons by such object or its
component parts on the Earth, in air space or in outer space .. " See Dembling,
Cosmos 954 and the Space Treaties, 6J. SPACE L. 124, 132 (1978) ("[The Convention]
codified art. VII of the Outer Space Treaty."); D. ZAFREN, CONVENTION ON INTERNA-
TIONAL LIABILITY FOR DAMAGE CAUSED BY SPACE OBJECTS: ANALYSIS AND BACK-
GROUND DATA 7, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (Comm. Print 1972), at 7 ("[Article VII],
although identifying the responsibility of launching States, is general in character and
does not provide a detailed procedural basis for presenting and considering claims").
President's Message to the Senate Transmitting the Convention on International Lia-
bility for Damage Caused by Space Objects (Mar. 29, 1972).
20. Convention, supra note 10, at Preamble. The liability established by art. II of
the Convention is sometimes referred to as strict rather than absolute liability,
because the Convention provides exculpatory circumstances. BRITISH INSTITUTE OF
INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW, CURRENT PROBLEMS IN SPACE LAw: A SYMPO-
SiUM 55 (1966) [hereinafter Symposium].
21. See U.N. Res. 2601B [XXIV], Dec. 16, 1969 ("[T]he Convention is intended to
establish international rules and procedures concerning liability for damage caused
by the launching of objects into outer space and to ensure, in particular, prompt and
equitable compensation for damage"); G.A. Res. 2733B [XXV], Dec. 16, 1970,
("[U]ntil an effective convention is concluded an unsatisfactory situation will exist in
which the remedies for damage caused by space objects are inadequate for the needs
of the nations and peoples of the world"). The Preamble to the Convention states
that the imperative for the Convention was the General Assembly's desire "that the
rights and obligations pertaining to the liability for damage as laid down in the
Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of
Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies should be elaborated in
a separate international instrument." G.A. Res. 2777 (XXVI), Nov. 29, 1971.
22. See G.A. Res. 2733B [XXV], Dec. 16, 1970.
23. The negotiations that produced the Convention lasted eight years. See G.A.
Res. 1963 (XVIII) (requesting COPUOS "to arrange for the prompt preparation of
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The Convention provides rules for determining liability and excul-
pation from liability. It also contains procedural rules for settling claims
brought under the liability provisions. The following sections briefly
summarize the contents of the pertinent procedural rules.
1. Liability Provisions
The Convention mandates that a launching State is absolutely liable for
damage caused by its space object and sustained either on the surface of
the Earth or by an aircraft in flight.24 For damage inflicted by the
launching State's object upon another State's space object, the Conven-
tion imposes a different standard of fault-based liability. 25 States that
cooperate in launching a space object are jointly and severally liable for
damage caused to a third State or its nationals.
2 6
2. Exculpatory Provisions
A launching State is not liable for damage caused by either the gross
negligence or the intentional act or omission of the claimant State or its
nationals. 2 7 The space activity of a launching State must conform with
international law to permit exoneration from liability. 28 The Conven-
tion does not apply to damage caused to nationals of the launching
State.
2 9
[a] draft agreement... on liability for damage caused by objects launched into outer
space .. "); G.A. Res. 2130 (XX) (Dec. 21, 1965) (urging COPUOS to "continue
with determination" the preparation of a draft agreement on liability); G.A. Res.
2260 (XXII) (Nov. 3, 1967) (calling upon COPUOS to "continue with a sense of
urgency" its draft agreement"); G.A. Res. 2601B (XXIV) (Dec. 16, 1969) (regretting
COPUOS's inability to complete a draft agreement). COPUOS presented the draft
Convention to the General Assembly on Nov. 4, 1971. On Nov. 29, 1971, the Gen-
eral Assembly adopted the draft agreement, as revised after presentation, by a vote of
93 to 0. D. ZAFREN, supra note 19, at 10 (Canada, Iran, Japan and Sweden abstained
from the vote).
24. Convention, supra note 10, at art. II. Article IV declares that an absolute lia-
bility regime also applies for damage caused by the space objects of two States to a
third State if the damage occurs on the Earth or to an aircraft in flight.
The altitude at which the earth's atmosphere gives way to outer space is disputed.
D. ZAFREN, supra note 19, at 1; Matte, supra note 16, at 357-86. A definition of outer
space that enjoys some international acceptance, and which this discussion applies, is
the region beyond 110 kilometers above sea level. Id. at 384-86; U.N. Doc.
A/AC.105/C.I/L.76 (1976); U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/L.121 (1979). An aircraft is a
vehicle that travels within the earth's atmosphere, below the level at which outer
space begins. A space object is an artificial object launched from earth to fly outside
the atmosphere.
25. Convention, supra note 10, at art. III. Under Article IV, the fault based stan-
dard also applies to the determination of liability for damage caused by the space
objects of two States to a third State when the damage occurs in space.
26. Id. at art. V.
27. Id. at art. VI.
28. Id. at art. VI.
29. Id. at art. X. E.R.C. VAN BOGAERT, AsPEcrs OF SPACE LAw 164 (1986) ("The
rule that damage to the nationals of the launching State will not be within the scope
of the Convention is an application of [the] traditional rule of international law ...
[that] [t]he relations between a State and its subjects are determined by the national
legislation of the State").
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3. Claims Procedures
A State may submit a claim to a launching State without first exhausting
all available local remedies.3 0 The basic means for resolution of a claim
is diplomatic negotiation.3 ' Compensation for damage is determined by
reference to international law and general principles of justice and
equity.
3 2
If diplomatic processes fail to resolve a claim, either party may
demand the formation of a Claims Commission ("Commission").33 The
Commission consists of an appointee of the claimant State, an appointee
of the launching State, and a Chairman chosen jointly by the parties.
3 4
The parties may agree to be bound by the Commission's determination
of liability and damage.35 If they do not agree to be bound, the Com-
mission recommends an award, which the parties must consider in good
faith.
3 6
Signatories have twice invoked the Convention. The United States
acknowledged its absolute liability under the Convention for damage
caused by Skylab, fragments of which fell in northwestern Australia on
July 11, 1979. 37 Canada alleged Soviet liability for the costs of cleaning
up debris, including radioactive material, strewn over Canadian territory
by Cosmos 954. The Soviet military reconnaissance satellite dis-
integrated upon re-entry into the atmosphere on January 24, 1979.38
30. Convention, supra note 10, at art. XI. A State may elect to pursue local reme-
dies, but may not simultaneously pursue both a local claim and a Convention claim
under the Convention.
31. Id. at art. IX.
32. Id. at art. XII.
33. Id. at art. XIV.
34. Id. at art. XV.
35. Id. at art. XIX. The bald language of the Convention requires a signatory
launching State to participate in claims commission proceedings if diplomatic negoti-
ations fail to resolve a claim. The Convention does not indicate what measures, if
any, a claimant State could take if the launching State refused to participate in a
claims commission.
36. Id. at art. XIX.
37. M. FORKOSCH, OUTER SPACE AND LEGAL LIABILIrY 185-87 (1982).
38. Canada billed the U.S.S.R. for $6,026,083.56 of the approximately $14 mil-
lion expended to clean up the Cosmos 954 debris. Christol, International Liability for
Damage Caused by Space Objects, 74 AM.J. INT'L L. 346 (1980). See also N.Y. Times, Jan.
24, 1979, at A7, col. 1. Canada's claim was for "those costs in respect of the opera-
tions which would not have been incurred had the satellite not entered Canadian
territory." Christol, supra, at 346 (citing a communique of the Government of Can-
ada, Department of External Affairs).
Canada ultimately accepted $3 million in settlement of its claim. N.Y. Times, Apr.
26, 1981, at A49, col. 3. It does not appear that the Convention was the ultimate
basis for the award. One scholar argued that "[t]he Liability Convention in its turn is
inapplicable because of the narrow definition of 'damage' as contained in the Con-
vention . . . 'loss of life, personal injury or other impairment of health; or loss of or
damage to property of States or of persons ......."Haanappel, Some Observations on the
Crash of the Cosmos 954, 6 J. SPACE L. 147, 148 (1978). Haanappel stated that "no
physical or property damage had been suffered by Canadian citizens. It also
appeared that no measurable damage had been caused to the Canadian environment
by the nuclear debris of the Cosmos." Id. (emphasis in original). Possibly recogniz-
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II. Analysis
A. Scope of the Convention
Two analytical frameworks are useful in examining the applicability of
the Convention to liability for harm caused by an SDI system. First, a
review of the history and mission of COPUOS highlights the limitations
on COPUOS's authority to legislate with respect to an SDI system. Sec-
ond, an interpretation of the language of the Convention in light of its
legislative history demonstrates further restrictions on the treaty's
scope. Together, the two frameworks reveal that the Convention gov-
erns only damage that a space object was not designed to produce, and that
the Convention is therefore insufficient to govern liability for SDI
malfunction.
1. History and Mission of COPUOS
Both the history and the mission of COPUOS indicates that the organ
was under no instruction to consider liability for malfunction of an SDI-
type system, and that neither the General Assembly nor COPUOS
undertook to identify legal issues peculiar to such a system. The Gen-
eral Assembly, for example, charged the ad hoc COPUOS with reporting
on "[t]he nature of legal problems which may arise in the carrying out of
programmes to explore outer space."3 9 The First Report of the ad hoc
COPUOS recognized its mission as defining and delimiting liability for
injury or damage which "might result from the launching, flight and
return to earth of various kinds of space vehicles or parts thereof."
'40
The use of the words "explore" and "flight" in the quoted passages
demonstrates the Convention's focus on accidental harm, versus harm
from space objects designed to be destructive. During the period of the
Convention's negotiation, the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. concentrated on the
development of communications and surveillance satellites under both
military and civilian auspices. 4 1 The threat of damage posed by these
ing that the damages Canada claimed were only arguably compensable under the
Convention, a Canadian official remarked of the settlement agreement that "[tihere
wasn't any damage to humans or property in the traditional sense." N.Y. Times, Apr.
26, 1981, at A14, col. 3.
39. U.N. Doc. A/4141, at 6 (emphasis added).
40. Id. at 64 (emphasis added).
41. See Christol, supra note 38, at 368 ("The [C]onvention did not attempt to deal
with all of the possible situations in which harm might result from activities in
space"). During the Eisenhower Administration, "the need to preserve the principle
and later practice of satellite reconnaissance was the overriding concern" shaping the
U.S. view of the international law of space. P. STARES, THE MILITARIZATION OF SPACE
51 (1985). Since 1957, the United States has conducted research on anti-satellite
weapons, but has not yet deployed them. Id. at 57-58. "Project Defender," begun in
1958, envisioned a system of space-based devices to detect ICBMs. N.Y. Times, Oct.
28, 1986, at C3, col. 1. The devices would launch homing projectiles to collide with
and destroy enemy missiles. Id. The conduct of such a top-secret, high-priority pro-
ject would have likely discouraged the U.S. from supporting instruments that might
impair its ability to pursue research and development.
Henry Cabot Lodge, U.S. Ambassador to the U.N., identified "in the field of dis-
armament... effective steps to explore methods whereby we can assure that outer
Cornell International Law Journal
space objects during the 1960s and early 1970s was wholly incidental to
their mission.4 2 Contemporaneous analyses emphasize the risk of unin-
tended collisions of the objects, their parts or their products with vul-
nerable objects. 4 3 In contrast to these early satellites, SDI would be
composed of a vast array of space objects with an explicitly destructive
mission.
Neither the U.S. nor the U.S.S.R. deployed weapons in space, and
the threats posed by one space object to another were accordingly lim-
ited to either accidental collision or some harmful effect of the object's
non-destructive function. 4 4 Examples of the latter include electrical
space will be used only for peaceful purposes" and "in the field of the peaceful uses
of outer space ... [preparation] for practicable and significant international coopera-
tion" as the U.S.'s goals in supporting the foundation of COPUOS. 39 DEP'T STATE
BULL. 975 (1958). Ambassador Lodge's statement suggests that the U.S. did not con-
sider the regulation of deployed space armaments to be the mission of COPUOS.
42. Dr. Thomas Wolfe, a RAND Corporation specialist in Soviet military affairs,
remarked in 1966 that "there seems to be little evidence that the Soviets have as yet
gone beyond what might be called military support types of activity in their overall
space program." STAFF OF SENATE COMMrrTEE ON AERONAUTICS AND SPACE SCIENCE,
SOVIET SPACE PROGRAMS, 1962-65: GOALS AND PURPOSES, ACHIEVEMENTS, PLANS, AND
INTERNATIONAL IMPLICATIONS (Comm. Print 1966). In 1968, the U.S.S.R. first tested
a satellite that could destroy other satellites by exploding nearby. Id. at 22. The
U.S.S.R. does not maintain such satellites in orbit, and the utility of the Soviet anti-
satellite system is disputed. During the 1960s, the U.S. developed an anti-satellite
system that used nuclear warheads. Id. The SDI program represents the first dedi-
cated effort to develop a practical space weapons system. Id. at 16.
43. See H. Safavi, The Problem of Applying Territorial Law in Outer Space, in PROCEED-
INGS OF THE THIRD COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 131, 137-38 (1961)
(the author apparently contemplates damage by accidental collision in observing the
difficulty of determining the applicable law: "[fIn the case of a collision between two
spacecraft of different nationalities in outer space .... There has been no interna-
tional agreement yet concerning the problem of responsibilities in the case of dam-
age caused by spacecraft.... [W]hen damage has been caused on the ground or in
the air space of a state, it means that the spacecraft that caused it, or the object that
came loose from the spacecraft, first penetrated into the air space of the country in
which damage was caused"); I.H. Diedericks-Verschoor, The Convention on International
Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, in PROCEEDINGS 15TH INTERNATIONAL COL-
LOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 96, 102 n.3 (1972) ("A good example of the
damage caused by spacecraft had been [advanced] in the [COPUOS Legal] Sub-Com-
mittee. . ." in U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR. 131. The document states that a Japa-
nese cargo boat had been struck and five of its crewmen injured by fragments from a
space object); Symposium, supra note 20, at 37-38, 45, 49-50 (1966) (analyzing the
draft Conventions submitted to COPUOS by Belgium, Hungary and the United
States and concluding that the drafts apply to damage caused by accidental collisions
and to "chemical, biological and radiological contamination [emitted] by returning
space objects").
There is apparently no analysis during the period of the Convention negotiation
suggesting that COPUOS accounted for the possibility of destruction by accidental
operation of a space object designed to attack other space objects.
44. See U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/85, Annex I (comments of the Italian delegation to
COPUOS) ("[lit is obvious that.., two space objects can cause damage to each other
only by (accidental) collision .... It is difficult, if not impossible, to conceive of
another cause."); D. ZAFREN, supra note 19, at 27 ("[A]rticle III of the Convention]
appears to be primarily concerned with a possible collision with space objects,
although damage sustained by a space object on the Moon or other celestial body
would also fall within its purview."). Christol, supra note 38, at 356, 359:
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interference, or physical damage resulting from the microwave emis-
sions of a radar reconnaissance satellite. In sum, the character of space
activity, both at the time COPUOS was founded and throughout the
period of negotiation of the Convention, suggests that COPUOS's mis-
sion did not include the formulation of liability law to govern destructive
military systems. 4 5
2. Language and Legislative Histoy of the Convention
The language and history of the Convention provide further evidence
that COPUOS did not address the possibility of SDI system malfunction.
Although the Convention does not explicitly exclude from its ambit lia-
bility for damage caused by an SDI system, it is clear that COPUOS did
not intend for the Convention to apply to SDI systems. An examination
of the principles which shaped the Convention further demonstrates
that extension of the Convention to an SDI system is inappropriate.
The Convention Preamble states that the document responds to
"the need to elaborate effective international rules and procedures con-
cerning liability for damage caused by space objects .... -46 Article I of
the Convention defines "damage" as "loss of life, personal injury or
other impairment of health; or loss of or damage to property of States or
of persons, natural or juridical, or property of intergovernmental orga-
nizations."'4 7 Additionally, Article I defines a "space object" as "compo-
nent parts of a space object as well as its launch vehicle and parts
thereof."'48 The language of the Convention might be reasonably inter-
preted to cover an SDI system., A close analysis, however, reveals that
this interpretation is incorrect.
a. The Definition of "Peaceful Uses and Purposes"
The General Assembly established COPUOS to consider issues sur-
[The Convention] provides for the possibility of collisions and malfunctions
and their consequences.... Malfunctioning that produces liability can take
numerous forms. It may result from launch failure, with harm to persons and
objects on the ground or in the air. Although quite unlikely, there is the
* possibility of collision between space objects. Loss of function can take place
after successful entry into orbit, which may result in fragments or radiation or
other forms of contamination-pollution reaching the earth.
Christol does not include among the possible malfunctions covered by the Conven-
tion the scenario of malfunction by an SDI-type system.
Literature contemporaneous with COPUOS's negotiation of the Convention sup-
ports the proposition that damage by collision or contamination was the issue before
the Committee. See J. FAWCETT, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USES OF OUTER SPACE
57 (1968) ("In space operations damage may occur through accidents on the launch-
ing ground; through spacecraft, including launchers, or fragments of them, falling to
the Earth; or through collisions between spacecraft and aircraft or between spacecraft
themselves"). See also Symposium, supra note 20 at 37-38, 49-50 (1966).
45. See supra note 4 1.
46. See Convention, supra note 10, at Preamble.
47. Id. at art. I.
48. Id.
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rounding the peaceful uses of space.49 The COPUOS member states
appear to have entered the Convention with the understanding that
COPUOS would not attempt to substantially restrict their military space
programs.5 0 The U.S. and the U.S.S.R., the states most active in space
during the late 1950s and early 1960s, supported COPUOS with the
understanding that the Committee would not constrain the military
space programs that each nation conducted and planned to undertake in
the future.5 1
COPUOS's practice of specifying the military activities it sought to
regulate reinforces the perception of the signatory states that the Con-
vention did not address weaponry. Article IV of the Outer Space
Treaty, for example, contains a prohibition on basing weapons of mass
destruction in outer space. 52 By contrast, the Convention does not
mention any sort of military activity. 5 3 This omission suggests that
COPUOS did not intend the Convention to dictate the legal implica-
tions of a military system designed to destroy space objects. Such a con-
clusion is consistent, moreover, with evidence that the focus of
COPUOS was on accidents involving ordinarily harmless objects. If
COPUOS had intended to address the implications of an SDI-type sys-
tem, the Committee's prior practice in document drafting suggests that
the Convention would have contained language explicitly including such
a system.
COPUOS's inclusion in the Convention of the phrases "peaceful
uses of space" and "peaceful purposes" reinforces the impression that
COPUOS did not address destructive military systems. One scholar
suggests that the use of these phrases indicates that the instrument
applies only to non-military space activity. 5 4 In other conventions
drafted by COPUOS, the Committee used the phrase "peaceful uses" to
mean non-military uses. In the Outer Space Treaty, for example, Article
49. Id. at Preamble. See also supra note 12. Cheng, The Legal Status of Outer Space
and Relevant Issues: Delimitation of Outer Space and Definition of Peaceful Use, I J. SPACE L.
89, 98 (1983), argues that "the very name given by the United Nations to its organs
dealing with space matters is indicative of th[e] pious hope [that outer space should
be used only for genuinely peaceful purposes]. Thus in 1958 it set up the ad hoc
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, and the following year the Commit-
tee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space .. "
COPUOS did regulate military affairs in Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty,
which prohibits stationing weapons of mass destruction in outer space. Consistent
with its limited jurisdiction to legislate with respect to military activity, however,
COPUOS has specifically indicated its intent to regulate military affairs on the few
instances when it has done so. The Convention contains no reference to military
activity.
50. See supra notes 12, 41.
51. Supra note 4 1. This understanding is implicit in the states' resistance to spe-
cific language respecting military activity in the Convention. The U.S. and the
U.S.S.R. have agreed to narrowly prescribed limits on military activity in space. An
example of such a limit is in art. IV of the Outer Space Treaty. Supra note 18. See also
supra note 41.
52. Supra note 18, at art. IV.
53. Convention, supra note 10.
54. Cheng, supra note 49, at 101.
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III essentially prohibits aggressive acts in outer space. 55 Article IV of the
Treaty allows only peaceful uses of the moon and other celestial bodies.
5 6
The Treaty defines outer space to include the moon and other celestial
bodies. 5 7 If "peaceful uses" in Article IV excluded only aggressive uses
of space, and not non-aggressive, military uses, Article IV would be
redundant with Article III. The only interpretation that preserves the
integrity of the treaty's language is that COPUOS intended "peaceful
uses" to exclude military uses.
The Preamble to the Convention indicates twice that in preparing
the Convention COPUOS intended to address issues surrounding the
peaceful use of outer space.5 8 This choice of language reflects
COPUOS's intent that the Convention address only non-destructive
space objects. This intention explicitly excludes coverage of an SDI
system.
5 9
The United States currently interprets "peaceful uses" of space to
the contrary, defining the phrase to signify "non-aggressive" rather than
"non-military" uses. 60 "Non-aggressive" uses comprehend military
activity consistent "with the United Nations Charter and other obliga-
tions of law." 6' The United Nations Charter permits member States to
act in self-defense. 62 By this interpretation, one might argue that SDI's
mission is a purely defensive, peaceful use of space. Therefore, an SDI
system falls within the Convention's ambit.
The above analysis fails, however, upon closer examination.
6 3
Today, for obvious political reasons, the U.S. desires that SDI be viewed
55. Supra note 18, at art. III (emphasis added).
56. Id. at art. IV, para. I (emphasis added).
57. Id. at art. III.
58. Convention, supra note 10, at Preamble.
59. The applicability of the Convention to liability for damage produced by non-
destructive military systems does not appear to be disputed. Application of the Con-
vention does not appear to interfere with a State's freedom to operate such systems.
Moreover, to exempt non-destructive military systems from the purview of the Con-
vention would diminish the Convention's effectiveness by encouraging States to insu-
late themselves from liability by assigning some military function to each of their
space objects.
The Cosmos 954 incident is the only case that allegedly involved a military space
object. See supra note 38 and accompanying text. The Soviet Union did not admit
that Cosmos 954 was a military reconnaissance satellite, although non-Soviet analysts
concluded that the satellite's mission was military. Id. The Soviet Union did not
dispute the application of the Convention in resolving the issue of liability for dam-
age caused by the re-entry of Cosmos 954. Id. It is important to note, however, that
Cosmos 954 was not designed to be destructive, and that the damage the satellite
caused was identical to the sort of damage that a non-military satellite incorporating
a nuclear reactor would have caused. The Cosmos incident does not support, there-
fore, the proposition that the Convention applies to all damage caused by a military
space object.
60. See Cheng, supra note 49, at 98-100 (surveying the development of the U.S.
definition of "peaceful purposes").
61. See supra note 41.
62. U.N. Charter, art. 51. See generally Gallagher, Legal Aspects of the Strategic Defense
Initiative, 11 MIL. L. REv. 45 (1986).
63. See supra note 49; Cheng, supra note 49, at 98-108.
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as a defensive, peaceful use of space. This contemporary political goal
of a single State, however, does not indicate that the COPUOS members
intended the Convention to cover military uses of space. Moreover, evi-
dence indicates that the U.S. entered the COPUOS negotiations with the
understanding that the Convention would not affect its military space
operations. 64 Finally, even if the view that the Convention covers some
military objects is correct, "peaceful uses" most likely encompasses only
non-destructive military space objects (such as surveillance satellites).
The definition of peaceful uses most likely intended when COPUOS
promulgated the Convention is "civilian" or "civil" uses. 65 This defini-
tion, obviously, explicitly excludes an SDI system.
66
b. Principle of Liability
The Convention's substantive principle of liability for damage caused in
space is another important indication of its scope. Article III of the
Convention requires that a State show fault before it can recover when
another State damages its space object.6 7 The requirement of proof of
fault, however, is inappropriate to an SDI system.
68
The rationale for a fault regime is that States which launch objects
into space impose identical risks on each other.69 Absolute liability, on
the other hand, is appropriate in circumstances in which an activity cre-
ates non-reciprocal risks and in which an injured party would find it diffi-
cult to prove fault. 70 Substantial evidence and arguments support the
inference that the Convention's use of a fault principle indicates that the
64. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
65. Cheng, supra note 49, at 100.
66. See supra note 49.
67. See supra note 25.
68. See supra note 43; infra notes 69, 78, 88 and accompanying text.
69. See Foster, The Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space
Objects, in 10 CAN. Y.B. OF INT'L L. 137, 154-55 (1972) ("It is difficult to foresee what
concept of liability other than that of fault could be applied to (such) cases.... The
position of both parties is equal; in undertaking space activities they must implicitly
be understood to have accepted the risks involved. Nor is there any reason to favor
one launching state over another.... Further, states actively engaged in space activi-
ties are in the best position to assess the presence of fault and to adduce evidence to
that end .. "). VAN BOGAERT, supra note 29, at 165-67 ("Absolute liability was espe-
cially [accepted in international law] for determined fields of activities which implied
important risks and for which the evidence of fault was practically impossible [to
acquire].... Fault liability must be considered as justified, because the parties are in
a position of equality with regard to their technological capacities .. "). G. Schra-
der, Liability for Damage from Space Activities, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWELFTH COLLO-
QUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE 86 (1970) ("[Tlhe greatest problem presented
by [the adoption of] a theory of other than absolute liability is the difficulty of proof.
The complexity of the mechanisms involved, the impossibility in many cases of
obtaining the cooperation of investigative bodies, the inadequacies of discovery tech-
niques and the lack of uniformity in national jurisprudence will all negate any theory
other than absolute liability").
70. See generally, D. ZAFREN, supra note 19, at 26-28.
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Convention was not intended to apply to an SDI system and cannot logi-
cally apply to such a system.
7 1
i. Difficulty of proof
The policy rationale behind the principle of absolute liability suggests
that COPUOS would have extended a rule of absolute liability to apply
to an SDI-type system if the Committee intended to address such a sys-
tem.7 2 A State asserting United States liability for damage caused by its
SDI system would find it difficult, and perhaps impossible, to gather the
information necessary to prove fault in the design, construction or oper-
ation of the system. This difficulty would result from U.S. reluctance to
divulge information about a sophisticated military system. That the
Committee did not so extend the rule indicates that the Committee did
not intend to legislate with respect to an SDI-type system.
ii. Reciprocal risk
A second indication that COPUOS did not intend the Convention to
apply to an SDI system is that the assumption of reciprocal risks which
underlies a fault principle does not apply to an SDI system. An SDI
system imposes on foreign space objects not only the reciprocal risks of
accidental collision and contamination, but also the unique risk of acci-
dental attack. 73 The non-reciprocal risks imposed by an SDI system
make the application of the Convention's rule of fault-based liability
inappropriate, and buttress the conclusion that COPUOS did not intend
for the Convention to govern liability for damage caused by the acciden-
tal attack of an SDI system.
7 4
iii. Joint and several liability
Article IV of the Convention declares that if a State's space object dam-
ages a second State's space object, and if the interaction in turn causes
damage to a third State, then the first two States shall be jointly and
severally liable to the third State. 75 The purpose of joint and several
71. See infra notes 72-75 and accompanying text.
72. Id. Statements made in COPUOS negotiations by the French delegate, U.N.
Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR [hereinafter "Sum. Rec."] 78, at 10; Rumanian delegate,
Sum. Rec. 91, at 16; U.K. delegate, Sum. Rec. 10, at 5; and U.S. delegate, Sum. Rec.
77, at 4-5 recognize the great difficulties claimants would face in proving fault. The
U.S. delegate adverted specifically to complexity of the evidence and to the possibil-
ity that evidence might be known only to the launching state and be impossible to
secure. Sum. Rec. 77, at 4-5. Several members urged that the extraordinary risk
posed by space activity warrants liability even if the launching State exercises the
highest degree of care. See, e.g., Sum. Rec. 50, at 6 and Sum. Rec. 79, at 5 (statements
of the Austrian delegate); Sum. Rec. 78, at 17 (statement of the Polish delegate).
Another argument for absolute liability brought before COPUOS was that the state
or states for whose benefit the risk was created, rather than innocent victims, should
bear the burden of loss that unavoidably accompanies space activity. See Sum. Rec.
91, at 9 (statement of the French delegate).
73. See N.Y. Times, Mar. 18, 1985, at A14, col. I (statement of Senator Biden).
74. See supra note 69.
75. See Convention, supra note 10, at art. IV.
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liability is to ease the burden on the injured party by making each mis-
feasor fully liable for the entire claim, or for any portion thereof, and by
allowing the injured party to proceed against any or all of the misfea-
sors. Article IV further declares that if the damage to the third State
occurs on the surface of the Earth or to aircraft in flight, the first two
States shall be absolutely liable.
7 6
Joint and several liability assumes that the actors contributing to the
harm of another either behaved wrongfully or assumed the risk of liabil-
ity for harm to innocent third parties. 77 A state assumes the risks of
space activity by operating space objects in a manner that imposes recip-
rocal risks on foreign space objects. For example, a State that orbits a
communications satellite assumes the risk that it may collide with a for-
eign satellite, causing damage to a third State. Both States assume the
identical risk of collision.
This assumption of reciprocal risks is inappropriate to the case of a
space object that is attacked by an SDI system and consequently dam-
ages a third State. An SDI system imposes non-reciprocal risks on other
space objects. Operation of a non-destructive space object, therefore,
cannot fairly be termed an assumption of the risk that the object, after
attack by a malfunctioning SDI weapon, might damage the object of
another State. COPUOS's failure to fashion an exemption from the rule
ofjoint and several liability for a State whose space object is damaged by
a malfunctioning SDI system indicates that COPUOS did not intend the
Convention to apply to damage caused by an SDI system.
c. Statements of COPUOS and its members
Herbert Reis, former legal advisor to the United States mission to the
United Nations and chief U.S. negotiator of the Convention from 1967,
has stated that the Convention is not a comprehensive statement of rules
and principles of liability for activities in space:
[The] fundamental purpose [of the United States] was to do what
could then be done to assure the payment of prompt and fair compensa-
tion to United States citizens who might be injured as a result of the re-
entry of a foreign man-made space payload or launch vehicle. There
remained a number of relatively exotic questions which the liability con-
vention did not try to answer, and which, if a treaty were to be completed
in a timely manner, had to be excluded from the negotiations. 78
76. Id.
77. See PROSSER & KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS § 47 (5th ed. 1984).
78. Reis, supra note 12, at 127; see also Message from the President of the United
States Transmitting the Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by
Space Objects v (92d Cong., 2d Sess., 1972) ("The purpose of the Convention is to
provide reasonable assurance of the payment of fair and prompt compensation in the
event that a space object of a State party causes injury or damage to the citizens of
another State party. For the United States, the [Convention] seeks to provide a relia-
ble legal basis for presenting our claims to a country whose space object has caused
injury to United States citizens and a guarantee that the other country will consider
the claim seriously and in good faith and will make an offer of compensation
accordingly").
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The statements of other COPUOS member States 79 as well as the
Committee speaking as a body80 indicate that COPUOS did not con-
sider its Convention negotiations to pertain to liability for damage
caused by an accidental attack by one space object on another. The his-
tory of negotiations on the draft Convention, furthermore, indicates that
COPUOS directed its attention mainly toward the possibility of acciden-
tal collisions involving space objects and accidental contamination by
material issued from space objects.8 ' U.S. proposals for Convention
language also demonstrate a primary concern with space-based vehicle
collisions.
8 2
79. The records of COPUOS negotiations over the Convention do not indicate
that any member of the Committee raised the prospect of a space object designed to
destroy other objects. This is not surprising given the absence of any such system, or
concerted efforts to develop such a system, during the period of negotiations and the
proposition that such a system would be beyond COPUOS's power to regulate.
Statements of Committee members, to the extent they reflect concern with particular
means of damage, refer to the possibility of collision or contamination. See, e.g., U.N.
Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR.108, June 27, 1968, (Statement of the Indian delegate to
COPUOS indicating that negotiations assumed damage caused by the motion of a
vehicle or its components, and that "[flrom the standpoint of the victim, it mattered
little whether the space object causing the damage was propelled by a conventional
engine or by a nuclear reactor"); U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR.105, June 24, 1968
(Summary of remarks of the Soviet delegate to COPUOS) ("The agreement on liabil-
ity ... would be much broader in scope [than the principle of lex loci delicti com-
missi] because a space object might fall elsewhere than on the territory of a given
state.... In the case of collision or interference of space objects ... it was agreed
that the principle of fault should be accepted .... ); U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/19, Annex
II (Working Paper submitted by the Belgian delegation to COPUOS) (impliedly
excluding liability for damage by the operation of a space object by suggesting "[a]n
obligation to give compensation [accrues] once proof has been given that there is a
relationship of cause and effect between the damage.., and the launching, motion or
descent of all or part of the space device .. ").
80. U.N. Doc. A/8420, Annex II, Sept. 1, 1971 (Statement of the Chairman of the
Legal Sub-Committee of COPUOS) ("[E]ven the peaceful exploration of space is not
free from dangers to active participants in space ventures and to others who might
happen to be at a place where an object returning to earth falls").
81. See supra notes 43-44, 78-79; Foster, supra note 69, at 154-55 ("[I]t is immate-
rial whether the injuries are suffered through physical impact with a space object or
result from biological, chemical or radiological contamination emanating from a
space object").
82. See, e.g., U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/37, Annex II (U.S. Proposed Convention, sug-
gesting an intent to include damage only from the motion, rather than from the oper-
ation, of space objects. "The Launching State shall be absolutely liable . . . for
damage . .. caused by the launching, transit or descent of all or part of a space
object); U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/L.8/Rev.2, Oct. 20, 1964 (Revised Convention
Proposal) ("The launching State shall be absolutely liable ... regardless of whether
... damage occurs during launching, after the object has gone into orbit, or during
the process of re-entry"); U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/L.8, Mar. 9, 1962 (U.S. Proposed
Convention: "If objects launched into outer space collide, there shall be no liability
as between states of registry or international organizations involved in the launching
of such objects").
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B. Proposed Law on Liability for Damage Caused by Accidental
Operation of an SDI System
Although the Convention fails to cover explicitly the scenario of harm
caused by an SDI system, it does provide a legal framework adaptable to
resolving disputes over such harm. Article VII of the Outer Space
Treaty advances a first principle of liability: States must bear responsi-
bility for harm their space activities cause to other States.8 3 The large
number of nations that have to date ratified the Outer Space Treaty and
the Convention testifies to the acceptability of this principle.84 The
United States, by deploying an SDI system, would inevitably impose cer-
tain novel risks on other States conducting space activities. The Outer
Space Treaty, the Convention, and other legal instruments bind the U.S.
to respect the principle of international responsibility for harm caused
by space objects. This principle obliges the United States to compen-
sate foreign States and entities harmed by the accidental operation of an
SDI system.
Proposals for new law to address harm caused by an SDI system
should respond to the same concerns that prompted negotiation of the
Convention: the appropriate standard of liability, the criteria for assess-
ing proper compensation, and the mechanism by which parties may
resolve claims.
85
1. The Appropriate Standard of Liability
Holding the United States absolutely liable if its SDI system accidentally
damages a foreign State or entity is the rule most consistent with current
international law.8 6 A rule of absolute liability of the United States best
accounts for the unreciprocated risks an SDI system would impose on
other States.
8 7
The difficulty a claimant State would have in obtaining the proof of
the workings of an SDI system necessary to establish the fault of the
United States also argues for a regime of absolute liability.8 8 It is
83. See supra note 19.
84. Ninety-three States have ratified the Outer Space Treaty; eighty have ratified
the Convention. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE, TREATIES IN FORCE: A LIST
OF TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES IN
FORCE ONJAN. 1, 1986 299-300.
85. See Message of the President, supra note 78, at v.
86. See Christol, supra note 38, at 352-53 (surveying the bases in international
common and treaty law for a norm of international responsibility and the develop-
ment of the fault provisions of the Convention).
87. Supra note 70; Foster, supra note 69 at 150-54 (1972) (citing the obstacles to
proof of fault and the high responsibility of a state undertaking a hazardous activity
as explanations for a rule of absolute liability). A rule of absolute liability is consis-
tent with United States domestic law, which may be reluctant to conclude that the
failure of a technological system incorporating novel and complex mechanisms indi-
cates negligence. Williams v. United States, 218 F.2d 473 (5th Cir. 1955) (rejecting
res ipsa loquitur as a basis for a trial court to notice the negligence of the United States
in operating a military aircraft that exploded in mid-air).
88. See U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR.77 at 4-5 (statement of U.S. delegate); Fos-
ter, supra note 87, at 150-51.
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unlikely that the United States would ever disclose highly classified
information on the workings of its SDI system.89 An absolute liability
rule, therefore, satisfies two potentially conflicting interests. The rule
allows the United States to preserve the secrecy of an SDI system, while
at the same time relieving the claimant State of the difficult burden of
obtaining evidence to prove fault. Absolute liability places the responsi-
bility for harm on the United States, the State that made the initial deci-
sion to undertake a novel activity for which no amount of care or
foresight may eliminate risks to innocent parties.9 0
2. Joint and Several Liability
A rule of strict joint and several liability is inappropriate to an SDI sys-
tem. The United States should be principally responsible for compen-
sating States for harm caused by an SDI system to the States of their
citizens. A rule that places the primary responsibility on the United
States respects the principle of a State's international liability for harm
caused by its space activity and allows for the allocation of responsibility
by the party best able to identify the cause of a malfunction. Imposing
liability on the United States satisfies the principle that "the State for
whose benefit the risk was created should bear the loss unavoidably
entailed in space activities rather than the random victims." 9 1
The U.S. would be in the best position to determine the cause of a
malfunction. The U.S., by treaty or contract, could bind parties cooper-
ating on an SDI project to indemnify the U.S. for damages paid for harm
caused by the conduct of the cooperating States.9 2 It could also conduct
indemnification proceedings to preserve the secrecy of information con-
cerning an SDI system.
9 3
89. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, July 1, 1985, at AI (Defense Department wishes halt to
U.S.-Soviet scientific exchanges that could reveal information on weaponry and state
secrets); N.Y. Times, Nov. 30, 1985, at A3 (President Reagan's pledge to share space-
based ABM system with the Soviet Union opposed by officials who wish to keep tech-
nology from Soviets).
90. Foster, supra note 69, at 151.
91. Id. The Convention appears to assume that the launching States are the
States that benefit from space activity. This assumption may not always be entirely
correct. For example, a number of States not involved with the launching of a com-
munications satellite may benefit from the satellite's operation. The extent to which
States other than the U.S. will enjoy the protection of an SDI system is currently
uncertain. The U.S. may also wish promises of indemnification for liability from
States that did not participate in the launching of the SDI system but experience
some protection from the system.
92. Since allies of the United States participate in SDI research with the expecta-
tion that they will enjoy some protection from a deployed SDI system, it seems
proper by this reasoning to require allies to share responsibility for damage resulting
from imperfections of a system.
93. The United States might, in negotiating for the participation of other states in
SDI research, require as a condition of participation that the states agree to partici-
pate in confidential indemnification negotiations should liability accrue to the United
States. See supra notes 13, 92.
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3. Exculpation from Liability
Consistent with the principles of the Convention, the U.S. should be
exonerated from liability for harm caused by the gross negligence or
intentional act or omission of a foreign State.94 For example, it is now
customary for the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. to notify one another of
planned ICBM test launches. If the Soviet Union were to test a ballistic
missile without notifying the United States, the United States could
fairly claim that harm caused to the missile by an SDI attack resulted
from the Soviet Union's gross negligence. 95 Similarly, if a foreign State
"provoked" an attack by an SDI system, perhaps with the goal of testing
the system's capabilities, then the United States should not be liable for
damage caused to the space object of the foreign State.9 6 Consistent
with the principles underlying absolute liability, the United States would
bear the burden of proving that damage produced by its SDI system was
due to the wrongful act of the claimant State.
9 7
4. Measuring Compensable Damage
Article I of the Convention defines compensable damage as "loss of life,
personal injury or other impairment of health, or loss of or damage to
property of States or of persons, natural orjudicial, or property of inter-
national inter-governmental organizations.''98 The definition leaves
open the question of whether damage includes harm remotely caused by
space activity, such as the costs to an employer of replacing an employee
injured by a space object, or non-physical damage, such as damages for
94. See Convention, supra note 10, art. VI. There is some controversy whether
development of an SDI system would at some point violate the 1972 Anti-Ballistic
Treaty between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. See, e.g., Gallagher, Legal Aspects of the Strategic
Defense Initiative, 11 MIL. L. REV. 11, 28 (Winter, 1986) ("[T]he [Reagan] Adminis-
tration has concluded that Phase I of the President's Strategic Defense Initiative,
which deals with pre-prototype research, does not violate the [ABM] Treaty and that
the Treaty would be violated only upon full-scale SDI deployment."); Sherr, Legal
Issues of the "Star Wars" Defense Program, 16 U. TOL. L. REV. 125, 128 (Fall, 1984) (con-
tending that art. V of the ABM Treaty prohibits development and testing, as well as
deployment, of a space-based ABM system). The United States may wish to abandon
or suitably modify Paragraph 2 of art. VI of the Convention, which prohibits exonera-
tion from liability for space activity not in conformity with international law, with
respect to an SDI system.
95. Harm caused in this situation may not reflect an imperfection in an SDI sys-
tem, and so may not be precisely "accidental." The SDI system here identifies an
object apparently identical in appearance, and possibly in behavior, to a hostile
ICBM. Since the target is not in fact hostile, and since certain characteristics of an
ICBM test flight may be observably different from those of an indisputable attack,
this Note will treat an attack by an SDI system on a test ICBM as a case of accidental
operation.
96. It is common practice for nations to obtain information on foreign weapons
systems by provoking the systems to operate. Not unexpectedly, this practice sub-
jects the provocateur to a risk of damage or destruction by the foreign system.
97. Without detailed knowledge about the proclivities of an SDI system, a claim-
ant State could find it difficult to rebut a presumption of its gross negligence or
intentional misconduct.
98. See Convention, supra note 10, at art. I.
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loss of consortium for the widow of a space accident victim.99
The United States interprets damage narrowly, as "damage tracea-
ble directly to the launching, flight and re-entry of a space object.., but
does not cover what some delegations ... called remote or indirect dam-
age and for which there is only a hypothetical causal connection with a
particular space activity."' 0 0 Under the U.S. interpretation, damage
would include injury to an object or to the passengers of an object
attacked by an SDI system.' 0 ' Damage would also include harm to
space objects, aircraft, or persons struck by fragments or harmful sub-
stances from an SDI system's target.10 2 The U.S. interpretation, how-
ever, precludes coverage of remote, consequential damages. For
example, the U.S. would not consider itself liable for the costs to a for-
eign State of responding to a military alert triggered by the accidental
operation of an SDI system.
5. Claims Procedures
The Convention provides a dispute mechanism available for resolving
99. Id. D. ZAFREN, supra note 19, at 23. The extent to which damage under the
Convention includes remote damage was a subject of much contention in COPUOS;
the imprecise definition may therefore represent a compromise in the interest of
breaking the impasse. The U.S. was interested throughout the negotiations in limit-
ing potential liability. The U.S. originally wished a $500 million ceiling on damages
claims. The Soviet Union and other COPUOS members opposed a ceiling. None
appeared in the final draft Convention. See N.Y. Times, Jan. 24, 1979, at A7, col. 1.
For a discussion of policy considerations relating to damages under the Convention,
see Christol, supra note 38, at 351. For a detailed discussion of the various interpreta-
tions of the types of damages recoverable under the Convention, see id. at 361-68.
The paucity of claims raised under the Convention means that there has been little
practical elaboration on the art. I definition of "damage." The loose definition of
damage in the Convention may also reflect the wish of a majority of COPUOS to
leave the definition of damage open in individual cases. Cf N.Y. Times, Feb. 5, 1978,
at A6, col. 2 (discussing the U.S.S.R.'s liability for damages caused by Cosmos 954, a
Canadian official notes that the Convention is "not specific about costs incurred in
tracking down debris and assessing public health risks"); N.Y. Times (general coun-
sel to NASA states "[tjhere is no question that the [U.S.] will pay damages [caused by
the re-entry of Skylab]. All a claimant will have to do is establish that the damage was
in fact caused by Skylab"). For discussions of the history of art. I, see Foster, supra
note 69, at 158 n.65; Christol, supra note 38, at 361. A proposed draft Convention
submitted by the Hungarian delegation to COPUOS allowed "[a] claim for damage
[to] be advanced on the ground of loss of profits and moral damage whenever com-
pensation for such damage is provided for by the law of the state liable for damage in
general." The U.S. draft Convention contained a limitation of liability provision.
COPUOS included no such provision in the final draft agreement.
The U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, during hearings on the Outer
Space Treaty, had expressed concern that art. VII of the Treaty might comprehend
non-physical damage. The Committee, after hearing testimony by administration
officials that such damage was not within the Treaty, recorded its understanding that
art. VII pertains only to physical, non-electronic damage. S. EXEC. REP. No. 8, 90th
Cong., 1st Sess. 4-5 (1967).
100. Statement of the U.S. representative to the Legal Sub-Committee of
COPUOS, June 30, 1971.
101. D. ZAFREN, supra note 19, at 24.
102. Id.
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SDI damage claims in Articles VII-XI and XIV-XX.10 3 The procedure
calls for diplomatic negotiations between the U.S. and the claimant State
or, if negotiation is unsuccessful, the formation of a Claims Commission
charged with recommending a solution. These practices appear to be
acceptable to space-faring nations, as evidenced by the number of States
that have ratified the Convention. 10 4 Moreover, such negotiations have
successfully resolved the two claims brought under the Convention to
date. 105
The practicability of securing international agreement on a more
binding means of resolving claims is doubtful. 10 6 COPUOS rejected a
U.S. provision for an international tribunal able to issue binding orders
resolving claims under the Convention.' 0 7 There is little evidence that
such a tribunal would be supported today-even by the U.S.' 0 8 The
current U.S. interest in keeping details about its SDI system secret
makes American cooperation with a nation before an international tribu-
nal unlikely. ' 09
Private negotiation, or the submission of claims to a body partly of
the United States's choosing, may encourage more candid and just treat-
ment of pertinent issues. Because the claimant would not bear the bur-
den of proving fault under an absolute liability regime, the issues in
dispute would ordinarily be causation and damages. 10 Claimants could
adduce proof of their allegations without a need for formal discovery
procedures if the United States were willing to supply basic information
about its SDI system. In situations in which resolution of the claim
required discovery of information the U.S. held confidential, the flexibil-
ity of private negotiations or of a knowledgeable panel could shape a
103. See Convention, supra note 10, arts. VII-XI, XIV-XX. "Awareness that the dif-
ferent [political and economic] interests [of various States] could in the future
develop into acute conflicts, is undoubtedly a convincing reason for being averse to
all compulsory procedures and for preferring the freedom of manoeuvre of negotia-
tions and traditional diplomatic intercourse." VAN BOGAERT, supra note 29, at 177.
But seeJ. FAWCETr, supra note 44, at 59 ("[Presentation of claims through diplomatic
channels or to an arbitration committee] is not likely to commend itself as a satisfac-
tory mode of settlement").
104. See supra note 84.
105. See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
106. See supra note 85.
107. See supra note 20. The United States in 1964 proposed that the International
Court ofJustice serve as an arbiter of last resort for claims arising under the Conven-
tion. U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/L.1 1 (U.S. Draft Convention) (proposed art. X "Any
dispute arising from the interpretation or application of this Convention, which is not
previously settled by other peaceful means of their own choosing, may be referred by
any Contracting Party thereto to the International Court of Justice for decision.").
As noted earlier, COPUOS did not incorporate this proposal into the final draft Con-
vention. See VAN BOGAERT, supra note 29, at 184-87.
108. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Oct. 8, 1985, at A5, col. 1 (U.S. announces it is ending its
policy of automatic compliance with decisions of the International Court ofJustice,
stating that Court procedures have been abused for policy ends and that most
nations do not automatically accept Court jurisdiction).
109. See supra note 89.
110. See text accompanying notes 69-71.
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discovery procedure to serve the interests of both the U.S. and the
claimant State.
Conclusion
The Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space
Objects is an inadequate source of law for resolving issues of liability for
harm caused by the accidental operation of an SDI system. The impor-
tance SDI has attained in the U.S. military program, and the recent pro-
posals to accelerate the development of certain SDI system components,
emphasize the importance of addressing liability for SDI system mal-
function. By combining the principles underlying the Convention with
new rules reflecting the unique characteristics of an SDI system, the
international community can fashion an appropriate legal framework.
Four rules would underlie this framework. First, the U.S. would be
absolutely liable for harm caused by an SDI malfunction, except to the
extent that the claimant caused its own harm through its gross negli-
gence or intentional behavior. Second, the U.S. may request or arrange
by agreement for indemnification from States that participate in the
development or operation of an SDI system or that benefit from the
operation of the SDI system. Third, the U.S. would compensate for all
damages except indirect or remote damages. Fourth, diplomatic
processes or an international Claims Commission would be the means
for resolving claims. In a new era of space-based weaponry, such rules
would provide a workable scheme for regulating liability.
Edward F. Hennessey

